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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law 
Human rights treaties are defined by their subject matter as those treaties that have the object 
of safeguarding those rights of individuals, which are somehow perceived as being inherent in 
their human dignity. They only impose obligations on their State Parties, and do not do so for 
third states. They create obligations between States vis-à-vis individuals. Through judicial 
bodies governing the observance of the human rights treaties, these individuals have effective 
resources to obtain remedies for violations of their rights. Their potential subject matters 
range from the right to life and liberty, to social, economic, and cultural rights, and the right 
to a sustainable environment. 
International human rights law (IHRL) witnessed its expansion in the second half of 
the twentieth century as the result of two devastating World Wars. In 1948, the General As-
sembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Subsequent important conven-
tions include the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)1, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),2 and the Op-
tional Protocol3 to the latter, all adopted in 1966. Substantial regional conventions include: the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 1950, the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ACHR) of 1969, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, and 
the Arab Charter on Human Rights of 2004.  
 International humanitarian law (IHL) is the laws applicable in times of war and armed 
conflict, also referred to as jus in bello. IHL originated at a time when the concept of (con-
temporary) human rights did not yet exist, and can be traced back at least to the 19th century 
when Henri Dunant began his action in favour of victims of war. IHL is a set of international 
rules, which are specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from 
international or non-international armed conflicts. Humanitarian law aims at placing restraints 
on the conduct of warfare so as to diminish its effects on the victims of the hostilities, whilst 
the use of deadly warfare is still a lawful measure to be taken into account. IHL experienced 
                                                
1 Hereinafter ICESCR, 1966, 161 parties to date 
2 Hereinafter ICCPR, 1966, 167 parties to date 
3 115 parties to date 
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its most comprehensive codification and developments in 1949 with the adoption of the four 
Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, each addressing the protection of specific 
categories of persons in situations of armed conflict. However, already in 1907, the Hague 
Regulations codified the law and customs of war on land. These treaty documents have been 
recognized as expressing customary international law.4 
 Even though both IHL and IHRL developed in the same era and are broadly similar 
legal regimes, the two were based on very different premises. Unlike human rights law, the 
protection afforded to individuals under humanitarian law was not an end in itself but rather 
primarily concerned with addressing the reciprocal rights of States. Accordingly, IHL obliga-
tions are not of an intra-State character but rather of an inter-State character. In contrast, 
IHRL binds all States vis-à-vis all those within their jurisdiction, and traditionally not apply-
ing to the relationship between a State and the nationals of an enemy belligerent State. Under 
IHRL all individuals enjoy a protection by the mere fact that they are ‘individuals’. Under 
IHL, however, there is an explicit distinction between ‘civilians’ and “combatants” which sits 
at its root. In IHL civilians as those that “do not take part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities”, while combatants “have the right to participate directly in hostilities”.5  
 Therefore, at first glance, the law of armed conflict and human rights law seem like a 
poor match. European participation in the armed conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and 
Libya, has forced us to ask the question whether signatory States to human rights treaties are 
obliged to protect the rights and freedoms of the Convention vis-à-vis individuals of non-State 
parties to the Convention.  
 
1.2 Object and Purpose of the Study 
This thesis sets out to examine the relationship between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, and the application of particular human rights in the context 
of armed conflicts. IHL is by its very nature in force whenever and wherever a state of de 
facto armed conflict is declared, whilst obligations under IHRL are considered not applicable 
in wartime and not outside a State’s own national territory. Thus, the preliminary question is 
whether human rights instruments are extraterritorially applicable outside a State’s own terri-
                                                
4 See the ‘International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1 
Rules’. 
5 Additional Protocol II Article 4(1) and Additional Protocol I Article 43(2) 
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tory. The triggering of jurisdiction extraterritorially is based either on a factual connection 
between the State and the territory affected – a spatial connection – or between the State and 
the individual concerned – a personal connection.  
 The principle question is whether the two fields of law develop in a way of fragmenting 
the legal framework that protects the individual; whether their requirements conflict with each 
other; or whether they develop towards forming the common legal ground for the protection 
of individuals in the context of an armed conflict. In practice, the crucial question when as-
sessing this interaction is whether the protection accorded to individuals under the IHRL is 
restricted when applied with IHL. With regards to this we will examine and compare cases 
from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). 
 The essence of fragmentation relates to ‘the splitting up of the law into highly special-
ized  “boxes” that claim relative autonomy from each other’.6 Fragmentation can take place 
through the conflicting interpretation of general law, the emergence of special law diverging 
from the general law, or the existence of two different bodies of special law.7 Thus, a related 
problem is that of normative conflict between the rules that relate to the same subject matter, 
yet require different outcomes in relation to it, for instance by virtue of one of them being lex 
specialis.8  
 An analyse of the extensive case law from this field, will allow us to understand the 
developments that have occurred and how international jurisdiction understand the relation-
ship between IHL and IHRL. When examining specific human rights in the context of armed 
conflicts the judicial bodies are confronted with situations of potential norm conflict. Our ana-
lyse will show how the European and American system of human rights protection approach 
IHL and how they interpret the applicable human rights treaties in light of IHL. Such an 
examination will show us whether they act harmoniously, whether they help fill in the gaps of 
each other, or whether one field of law has priority over the other.  
                                                
6 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,‘Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi-
culties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, pp. 13-14, (hereinafter ILC Frag-
mentation Report).  
7 Ibid p. 31-34 
8 Lex specialis. The principle that a particular law that may displace a more general law in the event of a conflict 
between the two. See ‘Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law’ (hereinafter Brownlie’s) (Oxford 
University Press, Eighth Edition), James Crawford, Glossary (lxxix), and Section 2.5 in this paper.  
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In chapter 2 we recapture the most relevant interpretational methods in international 
law, which can be applied so as to avoid a potential norm conflict. The following case law 
will be examined on this background. Chapter 3 will examine the relationship between IHRL 
and IHL. In section 3.2 we examine the geographical scope of human rights treaties. Section 
3.3 looks at the jurisprudence from the ICJ, and in section 3.4 we turn our attention to some 
specific human rights norms which have to be interpreted in the context of IHL. The subject 
matters that are chosen to be analysed in this paper, are rules of IHRL whom are in potential 
norm conflict with standards of IHL. We will explore the possibility that human rights bodies 
reach beyond the treaties that establish them and draw upon the principles of the law of armed 
conflict. The concluding chapter will sum up the findings from the extensive case law exam-
ination that have been conducted and hopefully give a better theoretical and practical under-
standing of the relationship between IHL and IHRL.   
 
2 METHODS OF NORM CONFLICT AVOIDANCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
The notion conflict exists between two norms “if one norm constitutes, has led to, or may lead 
to, a breach of the other.”9 What makes this such a crucial problem in international law rather 
than domestic law, is the fact that the former lacks the key method for resolving a genuine 
norm conflict, which is a centralized system with a developed hierarchy and that hierarchy 
being based on the sources of norms.10 Thus, in domestic systems a constitutional norm will 
prevail over a statutory one, while legislation will ordinarily prevail over executive orders or 
decrees. In international law, on the other hand, all sources of law are generally considered 
equal. Therefore, in international law, the methods to solve potential norm conflicts become a 
crucial issue, and form a part of the larger phenomenon of fragmentation of international law. 
The concept of fragmentation relates to “the splitting up of the law into highly specialized 
‘boxes’ that claim relative autonomy from each other and from the general law”.11 Fragmenta-
                                                
9 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International law’, pp. 175-176  
10 Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: Whiter Human Rights?’, p. 74 
11 ILC Fragmentation Report, p. 13 
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tion can take place through the conflicting interpretation of general law, the emergence of 
special law diverging from general law, or the existence of two different bodies of special 
law.12  
 This relates to the relationship between IHRL and IHL. IHRL has found its way into the 
realm of IHL, and has thus brought with it potentially conflicting standards of rules. When 
applying human rights law in the context of armed conflicts where IHL is traditionally under-
stood as the exclusive applicable regime, judicial human rights bodies are confronted with 
norms with different standards of protection. Human rights treaties themselves contain very 
few mechanisms to solve such a conflict, and those that do exist have rarely been used.13 This 
chapter will introduce some of the tools available to solve a case of potential norm conflict in 
the area between IHRL and IHL.  
 
2.2 UN Charter Article 103 
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter14 reads as follows:  
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the pre-
sent Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail. 
 
Article 103 does not say that the Charter itself prevails, but refers to “obligations under the 
Charter”. Apart from the rights and obligations contained in the Charter itself, this also covers 
duties based on binding decisions by the United Nations bodies. The most important case is 
that of Article 25 that obliges Member States to accept and carry out resolutions of the Se-
curity Council that have been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. If a Security Council 
resolution contains obligations of such an extent that it would violate the State’s other obliga-
tions under IHRL, the solution would have had to be that the obligation under IHRL would be 
set aside to the extent that it conflicted with obligations pursuant to Article 103.15 The obliga-
                                                
12 ILC Fragmentation Report, pp. 31-35 
13 This refers to the articles allowing a State party to derogate lawfully of some of its duties under the human 
rights conventions. For more see section 2.3.  
14 Hereinafter UN Charter 
15 ILC Fragmentation Repor §333 
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tions under article 103 would “prevail”, but not invalidate the conflicting treaty norm. The 
State is merely prohibited from fulfilling an obligation arising under that other norm. 16 Later 
we will see how the ECHR resolve a potential norm conflict arising between Article 5 of the 
Convention and a Security Council Resolution. 
 
2.3 Derogation Clauses in Human Rights Treaties 
Derogation clauses in human rights treaties have some of the same functions as Article 103 of 
the UN Charter. The only difference being that Article 103 will apply in general to potential 
norm conflicts, while derogations clauses can only solve a conflict if the state of emergency 
meets the requirements before an actual norm conflict rises. If the norm that is in conflict has 
not been lawfully derogated, the derogation clause will not solve the situation. The norm is 
still fully functioning.   
Such derogation clauses are found in: Article 4 of ICCPR17, Article 15 of ECHR and 
Article 27 of ACHR. They allow a State party unilaterally to derogate temporarily from a part 
of its obligations under the respective conventions. In essence, to invoke derogation, two 
fundamental conditions must be met: (i) the situation must amount to a public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation, and (ii) the state party must have officially proclaimed a 
state of emergency.18 The latter requirement is essential for the maintenance of the principle 
of legality and the rule of law when they are most needed.19 Examples of emergency situa-
tions include, but are not limited to, armed conflicts, civil and violent unrest, environmental 
and natural disasters, etc. According to HRC “[n]ot every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies 
as a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”.20 An armed conflict, therefore, 
does not automatically satisfy the criteria of “public emergency” as there is also a qualitative 
measure of severity that demands derogations to be permissible only to the “extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation”.21 This condition reflects upon the principle of 
                                                
16 Ibid §334 
17 See Commission on Human Rights, Report E/CN.4/1999/92 
18 See Human Rights Committee (hereinafter HRC), General Comment No. 29  §2 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. §3 
21 ICCPR Article 4(1) 
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proportionality, and relates to the duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the 
state of emergency.22  
Furthermore, measures derogating from provisions of the conventions must not be in-
consistent with the state’s “other obligations under international law”23. For example, while 
derogations from a human rights treaty are possible, it is not possible to derogate from IHL, 
because humanitarian law applies precisely to those situations that are amongst those justify-
ing the emergency derogation from human rights treaties. If an armed conflict occurs, the 
State will need to consider whether the situation is one that amounts to an emergency “threat-
ening the life of the nation”. As we will see, in many of the cases arising in the context of 
armed conflict, the ECHR emphasise that unless the State has derogated lawfully under Arti-
cle 15, it still remains in duty to oblige by the Conventional standards regardless of the situa-
tion on the ground. Therefore, in essence, derogation clauses aim at striking a balance be-
tween the protection of individual human rights and the protection of national needs in times 
of crisis. Whether a State refrains from derogation due to the fear of the situation not meeting 
the strict threshold of exigencies needed to be conducted, or due to possible negative reactions 
from the international communities, is hard to tell. Nevertheless, the ECHR has given States 
the opportunity to lawfully derogate from their obligations under the Convention. Whether it 
meets the requirements or not is another issue. If this tool is not used, it must face the scrutiny 
of the supervising Court.  
 
2.4 VCLT Article 31(3)(c) 
Article 31(3)(c) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that: 
 
There shall be taken into account, together with the context: … (c) any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
 
This Article is understood as the principle of “systematic integration” whereby an interna-
tional treaty is interpreted by reference to its normative environment.24 This Article does not 
solve a direct norm conflict, it is rather meant to help the interpreter in his legal reasoning to 
                                                
22 HRC General Comment no. 29, §4 
23 ECHR Article 15(1), ICCPR Article 4(1) 
24 ILC Fragmentation Report  §413 
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generate comparative law analogies in the development of judicial processes.25 This method 
of interpretation emphasises that the normative environment of a treaty cannot be ignored and 
thus, when interpreting the treaty, relevant rules of general international law should be borne 
in mind. The rules of international law applicable are rules of customary law, general law or 
other treaty based on international law. On the other hand, the normative weight a general rule 
carries, has to be argued on a case-by-case basis. In many of the cases analysed below we see 
that the courts make extensive use of rules and principles found in general international law 
when interpreting, but rarely refer to Article 31(3)(c) as the guiding tool. Nevertheless, the 
implicit use of this interpretation method allows Courts to find support in either direction 
when solving a norm conflict.  
   
2.5 The Principle of Lex Specialis 
The principle that special law derogates from general law is a widely accepted maxim of legal 
interpretation for the resolution of normative conflicts.26 As a principle, lex specialis can be 
understood in two different ways: First, the special rule may be considered an interpretation 
of a general rule in a given circumstance, as such, it becomes a rule for norm conflict avoid-
ance. The special rule should be read and understood within the confines or against the back-
ground of the standards of the general rule.27 Neither one overrides the other. The standard of 
the special rule are used as an interpretational tool when applied to the general. When ob-
served in this manner, it may not even give rise to a norm conflict in the stricter sense, be-
cause it can be seen as the simultaneous application of both. Secondly, lex specialis can be 
considered as a norm of conflict resolution, in the sense that the special rule can modify or set 
aside the general rule if the two rules are irreconcilable. Understood in this sense, the special 
rule is characterised as the prevailing norm, accordingly, if the standards found in the general 
rule are in conflict with the standards found in the special rule, the latter one prevails. The 
courts are thus left with the choice to either apply the special rule, disregarding the general 
rule, or declare a situation of direct norm conflict and decide on which set of norms it will 
apply to the specific case.  
 The first apparent problem is that, to invoke the lex specialis approach one must deter-
                                                
25 Brownlie’s p.35 
26 ILC Fragmentation Report §56 
27 ILC Fragmentation Report §56 
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mine de facto which rule is lex specialis and which is lex generalis. Used in the national legal 
order which consists of hierarchy and systematic relations, its applicability comes as a natural 
consequence of this system. Used on the fragmented legal system that is the international law, 
its applicability cannot be easily foreseen, because it does not provide any criteria for the de-
termination of whether one area of law is generally more important or special than the other. 
Nevertheless, the acceptance of the concept by international law has much to do with its 
ability to take into account particular circumstances, and as a result be more effective than the 
general rule when applied in a specific context. What has been suggested is that the special 
nature of the facts in a specific case justifies a deviation from what otherwise would be the 
“normal” course of action.28 
 
2.6 Peremptory Jus Cogens Norms  
In international law it has been accepted that there is a category of norms that are so funda-
mental that derogation from them can never be allowed.29 It has been positively expressed in 
VCLT Article 53: 
 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law 
is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character. 
 
A peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole. If a new peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law emerges, any existing treaty that conflicts with that norm is terminated.30 As such, 
the effect of one rule being a jus cogens norm is that it simply invalidates the conflicting 
norm. The conflicting norm becomes void and null, giving rise to no legal consequences.31 
Thus, it is a norm of hierarchal character, and not just a rule of precedence such as Article 103 
                                                
28 ILC Fragmentation Report §105 
29 ILC Fragmentation Report §361 and HRC General Comment No. 24 §8. 
30 VCLT Article 64 
31 VCLT Article 71 
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of the UN Charter.32 The nature and effects of jus cogens were summarized by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Furundzija judgment:  
 
“Because of the importance of the values it [the prohibition of torture] protects, this principle has ev-
olved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the interna-
tional hierarchy than treaty law and even “ordinary” customary rules. The most conspicuous conse-
quence of this higher rank is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by States through 
international treaties or local or special customs or even general customary rules not endowed with the 
same normative force.”33 
 
The most significant use of jus cogens as a conflict norm has been by the British House of 
Lords in the Pinochet case.34  Here, the question arose whether immunity of a former Head of 
State could be upheld against an accusation of having committed torture while in office.  Re-
ferring to relevant passages in the Furundzija, the Lords held that “the jus cogens nature of 
the international crime of torture justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture 
wherever committed”. The Pinochet litigation turned out to have historic consequences in the 
sense that for the first time a local domestic court denied immunity to a former Head of State 
on the grounds that there cannot be any immunity against a breach of jus cogens.35 
 Identifying jus cogens has to be done by reference to what is “accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole”.36 Examples of jus cogens are: the pro-
hibition of use of force, piracy, slavery and slave trade, genocide, racial discrimination and 
apartheid, torture, crimes against humanity, basic rules of international humanitarian law ap-
plicable in armed conflict (the prohibition of hostilities directed at the civilian population), the 
right to self-defence and self-determination.37 Some of these are more controversial than oth-
                                                
32 ILC Fragmentation Report §365 
33 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgment of 10 December 1998, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber II, 
§153. See ILC Fragmentation Report §370 
34 Regina v. Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (No. 3), 24 March 1999, 
House of Lords, 119 ILR, p. 136.  
35 ILC Fragmentation Report §371 
36 VCLT Article 53 
37 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, Commentary on Article 40, §4-
6, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth-sixth Session (A/56/10) pp. 283-284. See also Prosecutor 
v. Anto Furundzija  §151-157 
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ers, and the real issue is that there is no agreement about the criteria for inclusion on to that 
list. Therefore, International Law Commission (ILC) thought it best to leave to the courts and 
state practice to work out the contents of jus cogens.38   
 
2.7 Obligations Erga Omnes 
Obligations erga omnes are different from Article 103 of UN Charter and jus cogens. Erga 
omnes obligations designate the scope of application of the relevant law, and the procedural 
consequences that follow this.39 It is not the norm itself which is characterized as erga omnes, 
it is the obligation it gives rise to which is capable of being an erga omnes obligation. Nor-
mally, reciprocal obligations between States arise by virtue of binding treaties of bilateral 
character, limited only by the sovereign itself. State responsibility can thus only be invoked 
by the party to whom an international obligation is owed.40 Nevertheless, contemporary inter-
national law has accepted the creation of obligations of a more independent character, which 
cannot be meaningfully reduced into reciprocal State-to-State obligations.41 One famous case 
to articulate this was the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the Reservation to the Genocide Conven-
tion: 
 
“In such a convention [the Genocide Convention] the contracting States do not have any interests of 
their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those 
high purposes which are the raison d'être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type 
one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a per-
fect contractual balance between rights and duties.”42 
 
In another famous case, the obiter dictum in the Barcelona Traction case, the Court stated 
that: 
 
                                                
38 ILC Fragmentation Report §376 
39 ILC Fragmentation Report §380 
40 Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 
April 11, 1949  
pp. 181-182. 
41 ILC Fragmentation Report §385 
42 Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 15, p. 23 
12 
 
“[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the interna-
tional community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic pro-
tection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In the view of the importance of 
the rights involved, all States can be held to have legal interest in their protection; they are obligations 
erga omnes. 
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination…”43 
 
Such obligations are owed to the international community as a whole, and all States have a 
legal concern in their protection. In theory, where there is a violation of an erga omnes obliga-
tion, all states become “victim of the violations”. Thus, all States are procedurally entitled to 
invoke state responsibility.44 However, the obligation being erga omnes is not an indicator 
that it is of higher rank than other obligations, like jus cogens, or that it shall prevail like Arti-
cle 103. For example, if a State tortures its own citizens, no other State suffers any direct 
harm. Nevertheless, the acceptance by the international community as a whole, that the prohi-
bition of torture is the concern of all States, gives rise to a legal interest in their prosecution.45 
In Barcelona Tranction, the Court gave examples of such obligations also having the charac-
ter of jus cogens. However, these obligations must not be confused of being the same. Jus 
cogens norms might give rise to obligations ergma omnes, but not visa-versa.46 Accordingly, 
it is not the source of the norm, a human rights treaty or multilateral treaty, that is decisive for 
whether the norm gives rise to obligations erga omnes. It is rather the character of primary 
norms that determines the nature of secondary rules.47  
  
                                                
43 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3 (Second 
Phase) §33-34. Also see: Draft Articles of State Responsibility Article 48; HRC General Comment No. 31 
§2: “While article 2 [of ICCPR] is couched in terms of the obligations of State Parties towards individuals as 
the right-holders under the Covenant, every State Party has a legal interest in the performance by every other 
State Party of its obligations. This follows from the fact that the ‘rules concerning the basic rights of the hu-
man person’ are erga omnes obligations”. 
44 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, p. 196 
45 Draft Articles of State Responsibility Article 48(1)(b) 
46 ILC Fragmentation Report §404 
47 ILC Fragmentation Report §402 
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3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IHRL AND IHL 
3.1 Reconciling IHL and IHRL 
In this part of the thesis, the principle question of concern in this part of the thesis is whether 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law develop in a way of frag-
menting the legal framework that protects the individual, whether their requirements conflict 
with each other, or whether they develop towards forming a common legal ground for protec-
tion of individuals in the context of an armed conflict. In practical terms, the crucial issue is 
whether the protection provided to individuals under IHL is less than that under IHRL.  
 In this chapter we take on a closer look at two distinct judicial bodies and their ap-
proach to the questions arising from the interaction between IHL and IHRL, namely the Inter-
national Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. There are substantial dif-
ferences between ICJ and ECtHR because of the nature of their legal systems. The jurisdic-
tional competence of ICJ allows for it to consider all types of disputes between States that 
occur in any part of the globe concerning any area of international law.48 Accordingly, if the 
States to the dispute recognise the Courts jurisdiction, it is entirely up to the Court how it de-
cides to solve a case. The European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, is a regional 
court that deals with cases arising from individual applications against a State party, and its 
jurisdictional competence is limited to interpret and apply “the Convention and the protocols 
thereto”.49 Accordingly, the jurisdictional scope of the latter is much more limited than the 
former. Nevertheless, all international bodies that interpret principles and rules of interna-
tional law can apply the interpretation techniques, which are mentioned above.  
 
3.2 The Applicability of IHRL in Times of Armed Conflict 
3.2.1 Extraterritorial Applicability of the ECHR 
The ECtHR has declared that the Convention is a constitutional instrument of European pub-
lic order, and that it is not meant to apply throughout the world.50 European participation in 
                                                
48 The Statute of the International Court of Justice Chapter II, especially Article 38. 
49 ECHR Article 31, ACHR Article 62 
50 See Loizidouv. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) §75, Al-Skeini and Others v. the UK §141, Bankovic and 
Others v. Belgium and Others §80 
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the armed conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Libya, however, have forced us to question 
whether signatory States are obliged to protect the rights and freedoms of the Convention vis-
à-vis individuals of non-State parties to the Convention. This concerns the Convention’s ex-
traterritorial scope, and the question is whether the Convention extends to actions taken by 
signatory States in foreign territories, where several of them are occupying territory, adminis-
tering detention facilities, and conducting more limited military security operations. 
The question is therefore whether or not the meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR “within 
their jurisdiction” is limited to a territorial notion of jurisdiction found in general international 
law, or if it is understood broader. If so, this would entail that the actions of signatory States 
violating Convention norms will fall within the scope of ECHR, and accordingly entail state 
responsibility for its breach.  
Opponents to the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties often claim that 
the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ in human rights treaties is equivalent to the concept of  ‘jurisdic-
tion’ found in general international law. In general international law, jurisdiction is an aspect 
of state sovereignty, and refers to the power to regulate the conduct of natural and juridical 
persons within its territory through legislative, executive and judicial powers.51 The problem 
with this approach, as many scholars have emphasized, is that it tends to deny jurisdiction in 
human rights law terms if a state only exercises de facto authority abroad, but not de jure. If a 
state acts beyond its legal capacity under general international law it would not trigger the 
application of IHRL. Supporters of the extraterritorial application thus argue that jurisdiction 
in human rights treaties rather reflect a factual notion, the exercise of state power or authority, 
regardless of the legality of its acts in terms of general international law.  
 
3.2.1.1 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium 
During the events of the armed conflict within Former Yugoslavian Republic (FYR), NATO 
forces conducted military airstrikes over the territory resulting in one of the missiles hitting 
the building of Radio-Television Serbia killing sixteen people. Several signatory Parties to the 
ECHR are NATO members. FYR was at the time not a signatory Party to the ECHR. The 
applicants claimed that the proceedings were compatible ratione loci with the Convention 
since the impugned acts of the states, had brought the individuals within the jurisdiction of 
                                                
51 Brownlies p. 456 
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those states.52 The respondent states, on the other hand, argued that the application was 
incompatible ratione personae with the Convention, since the applicants did not fall within 
the jurisdiction of the states in terms of Article 1.53 The Court sided with the respondent states 
and concluded the case inadmissible because the applicants did not fall within the jurisdiction 
of the respondent states. Following we take a closer look at the Court’s reasoning.  
The legal question was “whether the applicants and their deceased relatives were, as a 
result of the extra-territorial act, capable of falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent 
States”.54 Article 1 of the ECHR express that: 
 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention. 
The Court begun with the ordinary meaning to be given to the words “within their jurisdic-
tion”.55 For the Court this meant that “the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily 
territorial” because the term reflecting the traditional concepts of state jurisdiction found in 
general international law.56 The Court reached this conclusion by interpreting the ordinary 
meaning of the words in light of relevant rules of international law. Accordingly, the Court 
held that: 
 
“Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial no-
tion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in 
the particular circumstances of each case”.57  
 
The concept of jurisdiction in general international law is to limit the extent of each 
state’s right to regulate conduct prescribed by domestic and international laws, and this right 
being limited by the equal rights and sovereignty of other states. For example, if the state 
conducts a ‘stop and search’ of a foreign vessel on the high seas – with the specific exception 
                                                
52 Bankovic §§30, 46-53 
53 Bankovic §§ 31, 35-45 
54 Bankovic §54 
55 VCLT Article 31(1) 
56 Bankovic §59, VCLT Article 31(3)(c) 
57 Bankovic §61 (emphasis added) 
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of piracy – its conducts is unlawful because states are not entitled to exercise jurisdiction on 
the high seas. Had it done the same thing within the limits of its territorial sea, on the other 
hand, this exercise of jurisdiction is in accordance with the Laws of the Sea.58 This is a lawful 
exercise of territorial jurisdiction within general international law. The notion of “jurisdic-
tion” within the ECHR need not be equivalent to that. Its purpose is to define the scope of 
signatory States positive and negative obligations under the Convention, regardless of the 
legitimacy of their acts or omissions. If “jurisdiction” were to be understood in the same sense 
as jurisdiction within general international law, it would mean that a signatory State, which 
had lost control over its territory, would be held liable for violations under the Convention. In 
Loizidou v. Turkey, the “effective overall control” Turkey exercised in the occupied territories 
of Cyprus, was attributable under its jurisdiction, and not Cyprus, precisely because Cyprus 
no longer had control over this part of its territory.59 Within general international law, Cyprus 
still held the jurisdictional title as the sovereign over the occupied area, but responsibility 
under the Convention was no longer attributable because it had lost de facto control over the 
areas.    
Bankovic then referred to subsequent practice for the clarification of the meaning of 
Article 1.60 Observing that no state had derogated under Article 15, the Court held that this 
had to indicate a belief that their actions extraterritorially did not involve an exercise of juris-
diction within the meaning of Article 1.61 Reference to “state practice” as an interpretation 
method, however, is limited when applied to human rights treaties. Like other human rights 
conventions, the European Convention has the European Court as its supervisory body en-
trusted with the function of interpreting and applying the treaty provisions.62 Naturally, it fol-
lows that to refer to “state practice” for the understanding of the application of human rights 
treaty, cannot be decisive. In Wemhoff v. Germany, the Court stated that it was necessary “to 
seek the interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realize the aim and achieve the ob-
ject of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations 
undertaken by the Parties.”63 Accordingly, the object and purpose of human rights treaties are 
                                                
58 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 2(1) and 87 
59 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) §56 
60 Bankovic §62, VCLT Article 31(3)(b) 
61 Bankovic §62 
62 ECHR Article 19 
63 Wemhoff v. Germany §8 
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to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and thus oblige the State to secure the free 
enjoyment of these rights. Consequently, if the Court were to interpret Article 1 wider it 
would place further restrictions on the State Parties. State Parties will thus always argue for a 
restrictive interpretation. The attitude and practice of these states can therefore not be of deci-
sive value. 
 The Court also cited the travaux préparatoires for support of a restrictive interpreta-
tion of Article 1.64 Claiming that the preparatory works were not decisive, the Court neverthe-
less points out that if the drafters had meant for a wider understanding of “jurisdiction” they 
would have adopted a text similar to that of common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, 
which express that it applies “in all circumstances”.65 Any recourse to preparatory works has 
to be done with caution, because one is always presented with the danger of interpreting the 
preparatory work instead of interpreting the treaty. In Loizidou, the Court even stated that 
provisions of the Convention could not “be interpreted solely in accordance with the inten-
tions of their authors as expressed more than forty years ago”.66 Countless times, the Euro-
pean Court has emphasized that the Convention is a “living instrument” which must be inter-
preted in light of present-day conditions, and interpreted and applied  “so as to make its safe-
guards practical and effective”.67 Therefore, this transparent reliance on travaux préparatoires 
leads to an unfortunate understanding of the text itself. Also, considering that preparatory 
works are supplementary means of interpretation they shall only be taken into consideration 
when an interpretation of the text leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure.68  
When referring to the espace juridiquem of the ECHR, the Court considered that the 
“special character of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order”, 
precluded the extraterritorial application of the Convention.69 Observing that FYR was not a 
signatory State to the Convention, the acts of the respondent states were therefore conducted 
outside the legal space of the Convention.70 In other words, in Bankovic the Court emphasize 
that if the acts occur on the territory of a state not a signatory to the Convention, the jurisdic-
                                                
64 Bankovic §63, VCLT Article 32 
65 Bankovic  §§65 and 75 
66 Loizidou (Preliminary Ojections) §71 
67 See Tyrer v. United Kingdom §31 and Loizidou (Preliminary Objections) §§71-72 
68 VCLT Article 32(a) 
69 Bankovic §§56 and 80  
70 Bankovic §§42 and 80 
18 
 
tion of the signatory Parties will not cover these individuals whom did not enjoy the rights 
and freedoms of the Convention in the first place.  
As noted above, human rights treaties primarily oblige states vis-à-vis individuals. The 
object and purpose of the Convention are to strengthen the rights and freedoms of the individ-
ual. Reference to the object and purpose of a treaty assumes particular importance in the in-
terpretation of human rights treaties. Consequently, any ambiguity in the provisions must be 
resolved in favor of an interpretation that is consistent with the character of these treaties, 
which is to promote and secure to the individuals their rights and freedoms, and not restrict 
them because states have not intended for its wider application.71 
 To sum up, by limiting the understanding of “jurisdiction” to something connected to 
the territory of a State, the Court in Bankovic restricts the application of ECHR to any area 
outside the espace juridique of the Convention stating that the Convention was not meant to 
be applied throughout the world, and thus rules the case inadmissible.72 Al-Skeini confronts 
this view, and as we will see, seriously challenge the interpretation the Court made in 
Bankovic. 
 
3.2.1.2 Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom 
In Al-Skeini v. UK, the Grand Chamber of ECtHR tried to bring some coherence to its previ-
ous conflicting case law on the extraterritorial application of ECHR.73 Observing that the 
Convention is the constitutional instrument of European public order, the Court rightly stated 
that the Convention does not oblige non State parties or allow Contracting Parties to impose 
Convention standards on other States.74 Then, it went on to state that: 
 
“where the territory of one Convention State is occupied by the armed forces of another, the occupy-
ing State should in principle be held accountable under the Convention for breaches of human rights 
                                                
71 Orakhelashvili, The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, 
Parallelism, or Convergence?’,  EJIL 2003, p. 535 
72 Bankovic §§75 and 84 
73 As Judge Bonello rightly points out in his Separate Opinion, the Court’s case-law on the subject is based on a 
need-to-apply patchwork kind of basis: “Principles settled in one judgement may appear more or less 
justifiable in themselves, but they then betray an awkward fit when measured against principles established 
in another.” Al-Skeini (Separate Opinion) Judge Bonello  §§4-5  
74 Al-Skeini §141 
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within the occupied territory, because to hold otherwise would be to deprive the population of that 
territory of the rights and freedoms hitherto enjoyed and would result in a ‘vacuum’ of protection 
within the ‘Convention legal space’ … However, the importance of establishing the occupying State's 
jurisdiction in such cases does not imply, a contrario, that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Conven-
tion can never exist outside the territory covered by the Council of Europe Member States. The Court 
has not in its case-law applied any such restriction (see amongst other examples Öcalan, Issa, Al-
Saadoon and Mufdhi, Medvedyev, all cited above).”75  
 
The first sentence of this extract confirms that the jurisdiction of the State does include acts 
occurring outside its own national territory but within the espace juridiquem of the ECHR.76 
However, the second sentence becomes more interesting. Here, the Court makes an excellent 
bypass of Bankovic by stating that these cases “do not imply, a contrario, that the jurisdiction 
under Article 1 of the Convention can never exist outside the territory covered by the Council 
of Europe Member States”.77 Accordingly, the Court concluded that since UK exercised 
“[some of] the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government”, the 
“authority and control” British forces exercised over the individuals killed establish a jurisdic-
tional link between them and the UK for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.78 
 Opening this window that Bankovic wanted to shut, gave the Court in Al-Skeini the 
opportunity to assess whether or not the acts of the UK forces in Iraq were compatible with 
the Convention. This examination is left to be examined in the next part. However, what this 
case goes to show is that the European Court has established that where there is a 
jurisdictional link between the State and the individual, the ECHR is applicable. Accordingly, 
the ECHR is applicable in times of conflict as well as in times of peace. Next, we will                                                 
75 Al-Skeini §142. The cases that are referred to here, are amongst those cases excluded due to lack of space. To 
sum up, even though the acts were done outside the territory of the State, jurisdicitonal link was confirmed 
in: Öcalan v. Turkey because Turkish authorities had effective control over the applicant, §91; in Issa and 
Others v. Turkey because Turkish military forces exercised temporarily effective overall control over some 
parts of northern Iraq, §§73-73; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom because British Coalition 
forces exercised de facto control over the detention facilities where the applicant were held, §87; in Med-
vedyev and Others v. France because French agents exercised full and exclusive control over a ship and its 
crew, §67 
76 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) §62 and (Merits) §56, Bankovic §80  
77 The Court even says that it “has not in its case-law applied any such restriction”. Firmly oposing the 
statements in Bankovic saying that the Convnetion was not designed to be applied throughout the world, 
even in respect of Contracting Parties. Al-Skeini §142 (emphasis added to “never”), and Bankovic §80.  
78 Al-Skeini §§149-150. 
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applicable in times of conflict as well as in times of peace. Next, we will examine cases where 
specific human rights norms have to be interpreted in the context of armed conflicts.  
 
3.2.2 Jurisprudence from the International Court of Justice 
3.2.2.1 The Legality of Nuclear Weapons 
The first time ICJ dealt with the relationship between IHL and IHRL was in the 1996 advisory 
opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons.79 The legal question was the interpretation of the 
relationship between the ‘right to life’ enshrined in Article 6 of the ICCPR in respect to situa-
tions of armed conflict regulated by IHL. The Court began with confirming that human rights 
law continue prima facie to apply in situations of armed conflict:  
 
 “The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain pro-
visions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, 
however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also 
in hostilities.”80 
 
By doing this, ICJ elegantly put an end to the long historical trend of rejecting the dichotomy 
between the ‘law of war’ and the ‘law of peace’, and this alone makes the opinion extremely 
important. The Court then went on to state its views on the relationship between the human 
right to life and the rules of IHL relating to the conduct of hostilities: 
 
“The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applic-
able lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the con-
duct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in war-
fare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only 
be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the 
Covenant itself.”81  
 
What the Court did was basically to use the general principle of systematic integration set out 
                                                
79 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter Nuclear Weapons), Advisory Opinion, p. 226 
80 Nuclear Weapons §25 
81 Nuclear Weapons §25 
21 
 
in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which allows the interpreter of a treaty to take into account 
relevant rules of international law. Article 6 of the ICCPR had to be interpreted with “refer-
ence” to the more specific standard of IHL, which were designed specifically for situations of 
armed conflict. Lex specialis did hardly more than indicate that even though it might have 
been desirable to apply only human rights standards, such a solution would have been too 
idealistic, bearing in mind the specialty and persistence of armed conflicts.82 Nevertheless, the 
Court emphasized as seen above that the special standards of IHL did not set aside the former. 
The Court was careful to point out that IHRL continues to apply in situations of armed con-
flict, and accordingly used lex specialis as a method of conflict avoidance. It was the wording 
of ICCPR Article 6 that allowed for such an interpretation, because what is “arbitrary” depri-
vation of life can be subjected to an interpretation due to its ambiguity. Both bodies of law 
applied concurrently. This confirms that the two regimes of international law interact and in-
fluence one another. What the Court did not do, on the other hand, was to elaborate to what 
extent a situation of armed conflict influenced the expression of “arbitrary deprivation of life” 
under Article 6. In the next case, the Court addresses the applicability in a more detailed con-
text.   
 
3.2.2.2 The Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Israeli Wall 
The second time the Court addressed the relationship between IHL and IHRL was in the Isra-
eli Wall advisory opinion of 2004.83 The starting point for the applicability of IHL to the con-
struction of the Wall lay with the fact that Palestinian territory is under Israeli occupation.84 
Then, the Court reiterated the parallel applicability of IHRL in times of belligerent occupation 
stating that ICCPR, ICESCR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child were applicable 
to the occupied territories because Israel exercised its territorial jurisdiction as the occupying 
Power.85  
                                                
82 ILC Fragmentation Report §104 
83 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Territory (hereinafter the Israeli Wall), 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Report, 2004, p 136 
84 The standards for applicability of the law of military occupation is that territory “is considered occupied when 
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army”, see the 1907 Hague Regulations Article 42, the 
Israeli Wall §78.  
85 The Israeli Wall §§106, 107-113, see ICCPR Article 2(1) 
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As to the relationship between IHL and IHRL, ICJ did apply the lex specialis princi-
ple, but in a slightly different way:  
 
“As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are 
thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian 
law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these 
branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into 
consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, 
international humanitarian law.”86 
 
The Court makes clear that not all circumstances will require resolving the relationship be-
tween IHL and IHRL, because certain matters are regulated only by one, and not the other 
However, the Court does not provide any specific clarification of which rules fall within 
which category, and on what basis. In this case the Court observed that the construction of the 
Wall led to the destruction or requisition of properties in violation of Articles 46 and 52 of the 
1907 Hague Regulations and Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Court pointed 
out that these destructions were not justified by military necessity.87 Furthermore, the Court 
observed that the construction of the Wall and its associated regime impede the exercise by 
the Palestinian population in the occupied territory of the right to work, to health services, to 
education and adequate standards of living, and in violation of the right to freedom of move-
ment and choice of residence protected under international human rights law.88 Accordingly, 
this was a situation of concurrent application of IHL and IHRL, as the Court had suggested, 
both areas were applicable to the subject matter. However, there was no conflict arising from 
this parallel application, because the two bodies of law were reinforcing each other.  
For the purpose of this paper, let us exemplify the other categories the Court sug-
gested. For example, IHL deals with issues relating to methods of combat, belligerent occupa-
tion and combatants, which are outside the purview of IHRL. Similarly, IHRL deals with the 
aspects of life in peacetime that are not regulated by IHL, such as freedom of press, the right 
to assembly, to vote and to strike. In these areas, the relevant bodies of law apply without be-
                                                
86 The Israeli Wall §106 
87 The Israeli Wall §135 
88 The Israeli Wall, §§132-134, see ICCPR Articles 12(1) and 17(1), ICESCR Articles 6, 7, 10.11,12,13,14, 
and the 1907 Hague Regulations Article 49  
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ing affected by the other regime. As in this case, where each body of law does regulate the 
particular issue, but without any disagreement occurring between them, both can be applied in 
parallel without having to consider the relationship between the two. This can also be the case 
where one has more detailed regulation, and thus ‘fill the gap’ where the other lack such a 
detailed regulation. The problem only arises where the two bodies of law are in clear conflict 
that one must determine the relationship between the relevant norms. When this is the case, 
the Court again refers to IHL as lex specialis. 
Criticism have been structured around the manner in which this lex specialis approach 
was used by ICJ.89 They express that it differs from that in Legality of Nuclear Weapons, for 
whereas the Court spoke of lex specialis nature of IHL with regards to one specific norm - the 
prohibiting of arbitrary deprivation of life, here it suggested that IHL as a body of law is lex 
specialis to IHRL. If the body of IHL is lex specialis, it would entail that whenever a specific 
human rights norm is in conflict with IHL which cannot be solved by interpretation methods 
such as harmonization, IHL would prevail all together, setting aside the entire regime of 
IHRL. In this sense, lex specialis function as a method of norm conflict resolution in sense 
that it sets aside the applicable rules of human rights law. Once specialis status has been de-
termined, there can be no accommodations between the specialist and the generalist bodies. 
The consequences would be that whenever a particular right is addressed by both IHL and 
IHRL, the generally wider standards of IHL would prevail. If this is to be the case, with IHL 
rules prevailing over applicable IHRL rules, regardless of specificity or appropriateness, it 
could create arbitrary results. More importantly, this view would compromise the consensus 
that IHRL continues prima facia to apply in armed conflicts. As Hill-Cawthorne points out, 
“if the lex specialis principle is indeed accepted as governing the relationship between IHL 
and IHRL, it would seem more appropriate that it be applied at the level of individual norms 
in specific circumstances, rather than at the level of entire legal regimes.”90 
 
                                                
89 Policy Brief 2007, ‘From Legal Theory to Policy Tools: International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, p. 8  
90 Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, ‘Just Another Case of Treaty Interpretation? Reconciling Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law in the ICJ’, an article in Mads Andenæs and Eirik Bjørge, The Centre Reassert Itself. 
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3.2.2.3 Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda 
The third time ICJ addressed the relationship between IHL and IHRL was in the 2005 case of 
DRC v. Uganda.91 A brief synopsis of the case illustrate that what was initially matter of con-
sensual presence of Ugandan troops on Congolese territory gradually turned into a large-scale 
use of armed force between DRC and Uganda, triggering the rules of IHL, in particular the 
rules concerning belligerent occupation. Finding that Ugandan troops had effectively taken 
control over the Ituri region in Uganda, the Court concluded that Uganda was an occupying 
Power. It was therefore under obligation to restore and ensure the law in force in the occupied 
country.92 Furthermore, having examined the case file submitted by credible sources, the 
Court found sufficient evidence to conclude that Ugandan troops had committed serious and 
widespread human rights and humanitarian law violations in the occupied part of DRC 
against the lives and property of the Congolese population.93  
The Court referred back to the quoted extract above from the Isreali Wall case, but, 
more or less intentionally, left out the last part referring to the principle of lex specialis.94 
Here, the Court concluded that “both branches of international law, namely international hu-
man rights law and international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consider-
ation.”95 It went on to apply both IHL and IHRL in parallel, when concluding that Uganda 
had violated its obligations under both these branches of international law.96  
The omission of any reference to the lex specialis approach can be supported by the 
sheer facts of the case, which were conducive to the full application of both IHL and IHRL 
without the need to consider the relationship between the two. For example, the Court found 
evidence of systematic attacks against the civilian population, which underestimates the right 
to life protected in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and in ICCPR and the African Charter 
on Human Rights.97 As seen, the violations committed constitute breaches of both IHL and 
IHRL, and therefore no question of conflict arose as to how the two bodies of law would 
                                                
91 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (hereinafter 
DRC v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168 
92 DRC v. Uganda §§172-180, see Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations 
93  DRC v. Uganda §§205-211, especially §211 
94 DRC v. Uganda §216 
95 DRC v. Uganda §216 
96 DRC v. Uganda §§217-220 
97 DRC v. Uganda §§206, 219, see Additional Protocol I Article 51 
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interact. Thus, the Court did not go into the consideration of whether the applicability of one 
body of law might affect the interpretation of the other.98 This is in contrast to the cases that 
we will examine next.  
As noted, ICJ deals with inter-State applications and as a result can apply IHL, which 
is applicable only between States, whereas the European Court of Human Rights deals with 
individual application where IHLR applies intra-State. The question in these applications are 
whether the State has violated any of the rights and freedoms set out in the European Conven-
tion vis-à-vis the individual. Accordingly, IHL may impose different obligations and stand-
ards on the State, which may conflict with the standards it has to oblige by under the ECHR. 
It is in these situations that hard cases of real norm conflict arise.  
 
3.3 Specific Human Rights in the Context of Armed Conflicts 
3.3.1 The Right to Life v. Military Necessity 
Article 2 of the European Convention: 
 
 (1) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intention-
ally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which 
this penalty is provided by law. 
 (2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it re-
sults from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
 (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
 (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained; 
 (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
 
Article 2 safeguards the right to life and sets out the circumstances when deprivation of life 
may be justified. It ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, from 
which in peacetime no derogation is permitted under Article 15.99 Article 2 covers both inten-
tional killing and situations where the legal use of force may result in the unintended taking of 
a life.100 Accordingly, the ‘right to life’ encapsulated in this article is not absolute. Indeed, 
                                                
98 DRC v. Uganda §§219-220 
99 Isayevav. Russia (hereinafter Isayeva) §172, Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey (hereinafter Özkan) §296  
100 See Ergi v. Turkey (hereinafeter Ergi) §79, Özkan §297 
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deprivation of life can be lawful provided that it fulfils a certain purpose outlined in the sec-
ond paragraph of the aforementioned Article, or if it falls under Article 15(2) concerning 
“lawful acts of war”.101 In several cases, the ECtHR have emphasised that the circumstances 
in which deprivation of life may be justified has to be strictly construed, and subject to the 
most careful scrutiny.102 The object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the 
protection of individual human beings also requires that Article 2 be interpreted and applied 
as to make its safeguards practical and effective.103 Furthermore, the words “no more than 
absolutely necessary” of Article 2(2) indicates a strict interpretation, and thus, required a more 
compelling test of necessity to be employed than what is normally applicable when determin-
ing whether measures taken by the State are “necessary in a democratic society” under para-
graphs 2 of Articles 8-11 of the Convention.104 Accordingly, the force used must be strictly 
proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in subparagraphs a-c of Article 2.105 
 In addition, Article 2 is considered to enshrine an implicit procedural requirement. Ac-
cording to case law, the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2, read in conjunc-
tion with the State’s general duty under Article 1 to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, requires by implication that there should 
be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result 
of the use of force, either by the State of by others.106 The essential purpose of such an inves-
tigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right 
to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for 
deaths occurring under their responsibility.107 The measures taken to achieve those purposes 
are left to the margin of appreciation of the State. However, whatever mode is employed, the 
                                                
101 ECHR Article 15 allows for derogation “in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war”, that 
nevertheless is “strictly requires by the exigencies of the situation”. This is a provision that states can use 
when in situations of armed conflict not to be held liable for breaches under the Convention. Nevertheles, 
ECHR Article 15(2) has never been assessed in a specific case by the ECtHR because it has never had a case 
before it where the State has called for its application, thus, relegating the issue of permissibility to the ambit 
of Article 2. 
102 Isayeva §172, Ergi §79, Özkan §296 
103 Özkan §296 
104 Isayeva §173, Ergi §79, Özkan §297 
105 Özkan §297 
106 Ergi §82, Özkan §309, Gülec v. Turkey §77 
107 Özkan §310 
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mere knowledge by the State of a killing gives rise ipso facto to an obligation to effectively 
investigate.108    
 A state of  ‘military necessity’ is under international law understood as justifying depar-
ture from the strict rules of IHL when the necessity of the situation overrules the manner in 
which the state can conducts its warfare. In the Hostage Case, the American Military Tribunal 
stated that: 
 
“military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of 
force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, 
and money. … It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction 
is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war”.109 
 
The concept of ‘military necessity’ allows for the use of intentional lethal force to kill the 
enemy. However, the concept must be considered alongside standards of IHL. IHL is pre-
cisely there to strike a balance between the principles of military necessity and humanity.110 
Accordingly, Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations state that “the right of belligerents to 
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited”. Furthermore, ‘military necessity’ has to 
strike a balance with the two cardinal principles of IHL; (i) the principle of distinction – be-
tween the civilian population and military targets reflected in Articles 48 and 51 of Additional 
Protocol I; (ii) the principle of limited warfare expressed in Article 51 of Additional Protocol 
I - requiring precautions measures to be taken when choosing means and methods of attack.  
 
3.3.1.1 Isayeva v. Russia 
In Isayeva v. Russia, Russian forces had conducted a special operation to round up the Che-
chen rebels with the purpose of destroying or disabling them. When the rebels were forced out 
of Grozny, they arrived in Katyr-Yurt village, unexpected by the civilian population. In the 
course of a three-day military operation, the aerial bombing killed or injured several civilians. 
As a result, the applicant claimed that the use of force by Russian military forces, which resul-
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109 United States v. List (The Hostage Case), at 1253 
110 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the 
Delicate Balance’, p. 798 
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ted in the deaths of her son and nieces, had violated Article 2 of the European Convention.111 
Russia, on the other hand, claimed that the attacks and its consequences were legitimate under 
Article 2(2)(a), i.e. they had resulted from the use of force absolutely necessary in the circum-
stances for protection of a person from unlawful violence.112 Russia argued that “the use of 
lethal force was necessary and proportionate to suppress the active resistance of the illegal 
armed groups, whose actions were a real threat to the life and health of the servicemen and 
civilians, as well as to the general interests of society and the state”.113 The Court recognised 
that the situation in Chechnya at the time “called for exceptional measures by the State” in 
order to regain control over the area and to suppress the illegal armed insurgency, and sug-
gested that “deployment of army units equipped with combat weapons, including military 
aviation and artillery” could be such exceptional measures.114 Thus, the Court accepted that 
the use of lethal force was justified within the exceptions of Article 2(2).115  
 Next, the Court had to justify whether the measures taken by Russia were “no more than 
absolutely necessary” for achieving the aims pursued.116 Therefore, the Court had to satisfy 
that the use of force was strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims pursued under 
Article 2(2)(a).117 What was necessary to examine was whether: 
 
“the operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest extent 
possible, recourse to lethal force. The authorities must take appropriate care to ensure that any risk to 
life is minimised. The Court must also examine whether the authorities were not negligent in their 
choice of action”.118 
 
                                                
111 Isayeva §163. Relevant parts of Article 2 reads: (1) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his convic-
tion of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. (2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as in-
flicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely 
necessary: (a); in defence of any person from unlawful violence 
112 Isayeva §170 
113 Ibid. 
114 Isayeva §180 
115 Ibid. 
116 Isayeva §181  
117 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom §194 
118 Isayeva §175, see also McCann and Others v. UK §194 and Ergi §79 
29 
 
Recalling the facts of the case, the Court found evidence indicating that the arrival of the reb-
els to Katyr-Yurt was not an unexpected event, but rather anticipated. Therefore, it held that 
the military had adequate time to plan the measures needed to protect the civilian popula-
tion.119  
 It is significant that the substance of these considerations are closely linked to standards 
under IHL. The principle of distinction requiring that civilians and combatants are held apart 
seems to have influenced the interpretation of ECHR Article 2.120 Furthermore, Article 57 of 
Additional Protocol I outlines the ‘precautionary measures’ to be taken into consideration 
when planning and conduction an attack. In paragraph 2(a)(i) it states that commanders have 
to do “everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor 
civilian objects”. Also under Article 57(2)(c) of the same Protocol, “effective advanced warn-
ing shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population”. Accordingly, the 
Court promulgates standards that are largely derived from IHL without explicitly referring to 
this corpus juris. In this sense, it interprets Article 2(2) broader than what the text itself gives 
rise to. Using these humanitarian principles without even respectively mentioning them in its 
argumentation, gives rise to the danger of applying these well-established standards of IHL 
wrongly.  
 Another assessment the Court had to make was whether the choice of weapons and 
methods that were used had been planned in such a way as to minimize their danger upon 
civilians.121 The Court declared that: 
 
“using this kind of weapon in a populated area, outside wartime and without prior evacuation of the 
civilians, is impossible to reconcile with the degree of caution expected from a law-enforcement body 
in a democratic society. … Even when faced with a situation where, as the Government submit, the 
population of the village had been held hostage by a large group of well-equipped and well-trained 
fighters, the primary aim of the operation should be to protect lives from unlawful violence. The mas-
sive use of indiscriminate weapons stands in flagrant contrast with this aim and cannot be considered 
compatible with the standard of care prerequisite to an operation of this kind involving the use of le-
thal force by State agents”.122  
                                                
119 Isayeva §184 
120 See Additional Protocol I Articles 48, 51, 57.  
121 Isayeva §§184-189 
122 Isayeva §191 (emphasis added) 
30 
 
 
Accordingly, the massive use of indiscriminate weapons in a populated area without taking all 
the precautions to protect the civilians was conceived as disproportionate. Again, the resem-
blance of this argumentation with IHL principles is inevitable. Article 57 paragraph 2(c)(iii) 
of Additional Protocol I requires that the commanders constantly take into consideration the 
risks imposed to the civilian population when planning military attacks, and if necessary, can-
cel the attacks if the risk of civilian casualties are higher than the military advantages gained 
as a result. The same article clearly states that all feasible precautions in the choice of means 
and methods employed shall aim at minimising the loss of civilian life, and effective warning 
mechanisms shall be given to the civilian population.123 The Court thus considers that the 
special circumstances arsing from an armed conflict has to be taken into consideration when 
interpreting Article 2, but that it nevertheless should be “the primary aim” of the State to ob-
lige by its obligations under the Convention.124 This statement can be understood as saying 
that even if a situation of armed conflict makes it necessary to use lethal force, the State still 
has to oblige by its obligations under the ECHR.  
 More importantly, under IHL there is as an explicit distinction between “civilians” and 
“combatants”. In contrast to “civilians”, combatants are those “participating directly in hostili-
ties”.125 As a result, IHL uses a decisive language for the distinction process. Under human 
rights law, on the other hand, this distinction is not necessary. IHRL applies to all peoples by 
virtue of being human beings, regardless of their status under other fields of international law.  
Nevertheless, the Court in the Isayeva case uses a language infected by this distinction be-
tween civilians and non-civilians special to IHL. Using this kind of humanitarian language 
without making an effort to define the terms within IHRL, causes some confusion as to the 
Court’s implicit use of IHL principles when interpreting the Convention. Noëlle Quénivet 
thus expresses that: “to speak of the principle of discrimination in context of HRL is unmis-
takeably a contradictio in terminis since HRL is based on the idea that all human beings are 
equal and should be treated as such.  
 To certain extent, the Court disregards the rights of those who are labelled fighters or 
                                                
123 See Additional Protocol I Article 57 § 2 (a) (ii) and (c).  
124 Isayeva §191 
125 Additional Protocol I Article 43. Also see Additional Protocol II Article 13: Civilians shall enjoy the protec-
tion afforded by this Part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
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combatants in the name of the lex specialis rule which is predicted on the premise that lethal 
force will be used and individuals killed”.126 The use of this humanitarian language and as-
sessment by the Court, without any reference to particular humanitarian rules and the under-
standing within this regime of their meaning, is unfortunate, especially when the Court’s use 
of these considerations comes close to the application of its principles almost by analogy. 
Even though the jurisdictional scope of the European Court does not extent to the direct ap-
plication of rules of humanitarian law, using IHL as means of interpretation of IHRL is an 
indirect way to achieve compliance with IHL. This compliance could be achieved through the 
expressed use of VCLT Article 31(3)(c), and in many cases the ECtHR have emphasised this 
interpretation tool and used general international law in its interpretations of the rules under 
the Convention.127 Nevertheless, Isayeva shows that the ECtHR is willing to examine the 
standards of the Convention with the help of prominently IHL principles. However, the Court 
only implicitly referred to these standards, and only because they helped to interpret Article 2 
in the specific contexts of armed conflicts. As Orakhelashvili states, “[i]n general the deci-
sions of the European Court of Human Rights on the matter of the right to life in armed con-
flict demonstrates that even though Article 2 of the Convention, drafted as a general clause, 
does not elaborate upon the specific conduct that may be expected by the Military in such 
contingencies, in terms of precaution, proportionality, and necessity, it can nevertheless be 
applied as having an effect on armed conflict comparable to that which the consistent applica-
tion of the detailed provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocol would have in internal armed 
conflicts”.128   
 
                                                
126 International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law p. 
344 
127 This is also difficult to understand inasmuch as the Court is obliged by virtue of Article 15(1) to take into 
consideration any relevant international law when interpreting the Convention in a situation of state of 
emergency. However, since this article is never invoked by the states when using force leading to deaths, 
this provision cannot be applied. 
128 Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, 
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3.3.2 Procedural Safeguards  
3.3.2.1 Ergi v. Turkey 
In Ergi v. Turkey, the Court did not find it established beyond reasonable doubt that the bullet 
which had killed the applicant pursuant to the armed clash between national forces and terror-
ist rebels, had been fired by Turkish security forces. Nevertheless, the Court declared that it 
had to consider whether the security forces’ operation had been “planned and conducted in 
such a way as to avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible, any risk to the lives of the 
villagers”, and whether the means and methods applied met these requirements.129 Relying on 
the Commission’s findings of facts in the case, the Court stated that there was no information 
to indicate that any steps or precautions had been taken to protect the villagers from being 
caught up in the conflict.130 Furthermore, regarding the procedural safeguards enshrined in 
Article 2, the Court also established that the authorities had failed to carry out an affective 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s death.131 Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 2.132  
Upon concluding that Turkey had violated the Convention requirements, the Court ex-
pressed some form of empathy to the crucial situation in south-east Turkey. Nevertheless, the 
Court emphasised that regardless of the prevalence of violent armed clashes or the high inci-
dence of fatalities occurring, the State could not displace the obligation under Article 2 to 
ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into the deaths arising out of 
clashes involving the security forces.133 This goes to show that situations of internal armed 
conflicts, governed especially in humanitarian law, still require the State to fulfil its obliga-
tions under the Convention, regardless of the harshening circumstances caused by an internal 
armed conflict. The Court would not interpret Article 2 as to restrict its application in such 
circumstances, however, the distinct approach to the question of necessity under Article 2 
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resemblance that of proportionality under IHL with regards to the principle of distinction be-
tween the civilian population and military objects when planning an attack.134  
 
3.3.2.2 Özkan v. Turkey 
Recalling the Courts considerations in Ergi, the Court established that the planning, conduct 
of the operation, and the means and methods applied did met the threshold of necessity en-
shrined in Article 2(2).135 However, regarding the procedural requirements of Article 2, the 
Court stated that for the investigation to be effective it is required that the persons responsible 
for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events. 
This meant not only “a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical in-
dependence”.136 Concluding that such an effective investigation was not done in this case, the 
Court again was “mindful” of the special security issues in these areas of south-east Turkey, 
but that the State nevertheless had to meet the requirements under the Convention.137 A situa-
tion of internal armed conflict, lasting several decades, could not be a sufficient ground for 
restricting the requirements upon a State to fulfil its obligations under the Convention faith-
fully.  
What both these cases show, is that the Court when applying Article 2, does use hu-
manitarian vocabulary when interpreting the threshold of necessity as to fill the gaps the Con-
vention is left with in the context of armed conflicts. The Court did not state that the standards 
of Article 2 when applied to special circumstances of armed conflict gave rise to a different 
standard of protection. What the Court seem to have done is to have taken into consideration 
the special circumstances arsing from such a situation, but that it nevertheless did not allow 
for a restrictive interpretation of the Article. This is another way of saying that the ECHR ap-
plies both in peacetime and in times of conflict. The protection given by the Convention to 
individuals is not altered by extraordinary circumstances unless the State has lawfully dero-
gated under Article 15. Staying true to its roots as a human rights body, the Court therefore 
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seems to not take into consideration any applicable rules of IHL that might alter this protec-
tion.  
 
3.3.2.3 Kononov v. Latvia 
In Kononom v. Latvia, the applicant, a former Soviet partisan during World War II, had been 
convicted by the domestic courts of Latvia for war crimes under its domestic law, which were 
based on international law.138 The question was whether the principle of law - accessibility 
and foreseeability – of Article 7 under ECHR had been violated.139 In the domestic laws of 
states, criminal law has to meet the requirements of this principle, however, there is an ele-
ment of judicial interpretation incumbent in this area of law. Accordingly, the Article allows 
for domestic courts to clarify the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from 
case to case, provided that the resultant development is consistent with the essence of the of-
fence and could reasonably be foreseen.140 Moreover, this also applies where domestic law 
refers to rules of general international law or international agreements.141  
 The Court stated that its task was not to decide directly whether the provisions of inter-
national law were compatible with ECHR, but whether the interpretation of the former by the 
domestic courts were compatible with the latter.142 In this sense, the Court entered into the 
realm of IHL through the backdoor. Both the applicants and the respondent Governments had 
in their public hearings relied heavily on provisions of international criminal law and IHL, 
such as the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols I and II, 1907 Hague Regulations and 
customary humanitarian law.143 Accordingly, the Court had an excellent opportunity to assess 
the relationship between IHL and IHRL without it being a politically disputed issue by the 
respondent Governments. If they themselves had interpreted and applied IHL in their domes-
                                                
138 Kononov v. Latvia (hereinafter Kononov) §196. Also see the similar case of Korbely v. Hungary (hereinafter 
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139 The relevant part of ECHR Article 7(1) reads: No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account 
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140 Kononom §196, also Korbely §71 
141 See Korbely §72 
142Kononov §197, also Korbely §72 
143 Kononov §§52-96, also Korbely §§48-52 
35 
 
tic courts, then this gave the Court an opportunity to assess whether or not their interpreta-
tional outcomes were compatible with the standards set out in the Convention, more precisely, 
with Article 7. However, in order to decide whether or not the domestic courts themselves had 
interpreted and applied IHL correctly, the Court itself had to independently interpret these 
provisions and apply them to the concrete case. Having regard to the subject matter – crimes 
of war – the Court had to examine two things: first, whether there was a sufficiently clear le-
gal basis for the applicant’s conviction of war crimes, and secondly, examine whether those 
offences were defined by law with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability so that the appli-
cants could have known that his acts and omissions would make him criminally liable for 
such crimes and accordingly had an opportunity to regulate his conducts thereby.144 
 In Kononov, the Court, referring to applicable jus in bello being the laws of war, held 
that the ill-treatment, wounding and killing of the villagers which the applicant had been con-
victed for under domestic law, constituted a war crime under IHL.145 The Court referred ex-
plicitly to Article 23(c) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which forbids the killing or wounding 
of “an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has 
surrendered at discretion” (hors de combat).146 Furthermore, the Court stated that the addi-
tional conviction of the applicant with regards the treacherous wounding and killing, also con-
stituted a war crime under IHL, and referred to Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Regulations 
which prohibits the “treacherously [killing or wounding of] individuals belonging to the hos-
tile nation or army”.147 Accordingly, having confirmed that the domestic courts had sufficient 
legal basis in IHL to convict the applicant for the crimes of war, it turned to the question 
whether these provision were compatible with the requirements under Article 7 as accessible 
and foreseeable.  
 The Court recalled that the concept of foreseeability depends considerable “on the con-
tent of the instrument in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of 
those to whom it is addressed”, and that any “person carrying on a professional activity must 
proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation and can be expected to 
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take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails”.148 Then the Court went on to 
state that the applied IHL constituted “detailed lex specialis regulations fixing the parameters 
of criminal conduct in a time of war, primarily addressed to armed forces and, especially, 
commanders”.149 Given that the applicant had the status of commander sergeant, the Court 
was of the view that he could have been reasonably expected to take special care in assessing 
the consequences of his actions.150 For these reasons the Court concluded that the offences 
were both accessible and foreseeable for the applicant, and thus did not constitute a violation 
of Article 7(1) of the ECHR.151  
 This case goes to show that the European Court has gradually accepted the income of 
IHL in its interpretation and application of the Conventional standards. From only referring to 
IHL sub silentio in Isayeva, Ergi and Özkan, this time the Court made extensive references to 
IHL when interpreting Article 7. Even though the Court stated that its task was to interpret the 
domestic courts’ use of IHL, it nevertheless had to interpret these standards separately when 
confronting them with the standards of the Convention. The subject matter being “war 
crimes” also made IHL the lex specialis of applicable law. This statement by the Court is re-
markably considering its traditional reluctance to even refer to relevant rules of IHL when 
assessing cases in the context of armed conflicts. This is definitively a step in the right direc-
tion. As we will see in the next cases, this openness to include IHL as a relevant source of 
interpretation becomes crucial in the cases arising from Member States’ participation in 
armed conflict and occupation in places such as Iraq.  
 
3.3.2.4 Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom 
When we analysed the Al-Skeini case above, the perspective was the ECtHR approach to the 
question of extraterritorial application of the European Convention. This case confirmed that 
the meaning of “within their jurisdiction” of Article 1 also included the acts of a State violat-
ing the Convention outside the national territory of the State. When we turn our attention to 
the merits, the applicants claimed that UK had breached the procedural requirement of Article 
2 to carry out an effective investigation into killings caused by British forces. The UK argued 
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that the procedural duty under Article 2 had to be interpreted in harmony with the relevant 
principles of international law, and that any implied duty should not be interpreted in such a 
way as to place an impossible or disproportionate burden on a Contracting State.152 The appli-
cants, on the other hand, emphasised that the Court's case law regarding south-eastern Turkey 
demonstrated that the procedural duty under Article 2 was not interpreted restrictively by re-
ference to security problems in a conflict zone.153 
 The Court begun by acknowledging the security problems arising in the aftermath of the 
invasion of Iraq, where serious breakdowns in the civilian infrastructure, including the law 
enforcement and criminal justice systems made the efforts of the Coalition Forces difficult.154 
However, the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument of protection of individ-
ual human beings required that “its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its 
safeguards practical and effective”.155 Recalling the conclusions in Ergi and Özkan, the Court 
held that the procedural requirement under Article 2 continued to apply in difficult security 
conditions, including armed conflict.156 Nevertheless, the Court held that:  
  
“[However] the investigation should also be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to 
take into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who directly used lethal force but also 
all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the oper-
ations in question, where this is necessary in order to determine whether the State complied with its 
obligation under Article 2 to protect life”.157 
 
Following this statement, the Court further acknowledged the difficulties and obstacles which 
takes place in the context of armed conflicts, and even that concrete constraints may compel 
the use of less effective measures of investigations.158 Nevertheless, the Court still em-
phasized that even in these situations, Article 2 required that “all reasonable steps must be 
taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged breaches 
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of the right to life”.159 The Court declared that for an investigation to be effective, measures 
such as securing evidence, testimonies, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy 
should be amongst those methods.160 Including the independence of the investigator, the re-
quirements of promptness and reasonable expedition should also be met.161   
 When applied to the case, the Court called for the procedural duty under Article 2 to be 
“realistically” applied.162 In this case, the Court concluded on the main ground that the inves-
tigating body was not operationally independent because of the lack of institutional independ-
ence of the investigators from the military chain of command.163 Nevertheless, this case still 
raises the question of how far the ECtHR will go to stretch the procedural duty to make it ap-
plicable realistically in the context of armed conflicts. It showed that it would take into con-
siderations the difficulties arising, and not demand unrealistic duties from the Parties.   
 
3.3.3 The Right to Liberty v. Preventive Detention 
Preventive detention, also called internment, is among those issues where the complex inter-
play between IHL and IHRL is felt most acutely.164 It is an area of potentially irresolvable 
norm conflict. Under IHL an Occupying Power have legal basis for preventive detention of 
both prisoners of war and protected persons during an international armed conflicts. First, 
under Article 21 of the third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war may be subjected to in-
ternment, i.e. they may be detained on purely preventive grounds so that they do not rejoin the 
hostilities.165 Under this provision, it is not required by the detaining power to prove that it is 
necessary to detain. Secondly, under Articles 41-43 and 78 of the fourth Geneva Convention, 
protected persons may also be subjected to internment “if the security of the Detaining Power 
makes it absolutely necessary”.166 Accordingly, IHL poses a stricter requirement for the in-
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ternment of civilians than of combatants. In IHRL, different instruments have different regu-
lations of detention. CCPR Article 9(1) provides that: 
 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law. 
 
ECHR Article 5 stipulates that: 
 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in 
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. 
 
Article 9(1) of the CCPR prohibits “arbitrary” arrest or detention. What is an “arbitrary” arrest 
or detention is not defined in the Covenant, and is open for interpretations due to its vague-
ness. On the contrary, Article 5(1) of the ECHR contains an exhaustive list of permissible 
exceptions in subparagraphs a-f. Therefore, no deprivation of liberty will be compatible with 
Article 5(1) unless it falls within one of those exceptions, or provided that the State has dero-
gated legally under Article 15 of the Convention. As we have seen in Nuclear Weapons, ICJ 
stated “arbitrary deprivation of life” in IHRL was to be determined through interpretation of 
the special rules of IHL. Lex specialis was used as a norm for conflict avoidance. The ‘arbi-
trariness’ standard in CCPR Article 9(1) could be interpreted while taking into account the 
rules of IHL. If this is applied to ECHR Article 5(1), we are left with a problem. This provi-
sion, as stated above, has exhausted any ‘window’ with which IHL could enter through inter-
pretation. This was exactly the circumstance in the case of Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, 
which we will now turn our attention to. 
 
3.3.3.1 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom167 
The applicant claimed that the UK had violated Article 5(1) of ECHR following his three year 
long detention based on “imperative reasons of security” in a British military facility in Iraq 
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without any criminal charges being brought against him.168 The Court held that “it has long 
been established that the list of grounds of permissible detention in Article 5 § 1 does not in-
clude internment or preventive detention where there is no intention to bring criminal charges 
within a reasonable time.”169 UK did not contend that the detention was justified under sub-
paragraphs a-f, nor Article 15. Instead, they argued that there was no violation of Article 5(1) 
because UK’s duties under that provision were displaced by the counter-duty imposed by the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. They contended that, as a result of the op-
eration of Article 103 of the UN Charter, the obligations of UN Member States to “accept and 
carry out decisions of the Security Council” under Article 25 of the Charter, prevailed over 
those under the European Convention.170 The legal question was whether UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1546 placed UK under an obligation to hold the applicant under detention con-
trary to its obligations under Article 5(1) of the ECHR.  
The Court did not consider that the language used in this Resolution indicated unam-
biguously that the Security Council intended to place Member States within the Multi-
National Force under an obligation to use measures of indefinite internment without charge 
and without judicial guarantees, in breach of their undertakings under international human 
rights instruments including the Convention.171 Internment was not expressly referred to in 
the Resolution itself but rather in the annexed letter from the US Secretary of State.172 The 
Court even established an interpretative presumption that the Security Council did not intend 
to ‘oblige’ its Member States to do something contrary to their obligations under human rights 
law, and therefore concluded that the Resolution could not be interpreted as obliging a Mem-
ber State to use internment. Accordingly, it was not needed to use Article 103 of the UN 
Charter because there were no contradictory obligations. 
Another question was whether IHL gave rise to a legal basis for the preventive deten-
tion of the applicant.173 The UK claimed that the “special authorities, responsibilities and ob-
ligations” of the Occupying Power expressed in the Resolution 1546, gave UK the obligation 
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under IHL to use internment.174 The Court could not find it established that IHL placed an 
obligation on an Occupying Power to use indefinite internment without trial.175 The Court 
held that Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires an Occupying Power “to take all meas-
ures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while re-
specting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”. Then the Court stated 
that “it would appear from the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that under inter-
national humanitarian law internment is to be viewed not as an obligation on the Occupying 
Power but as a measure of last resort”.176 This is where it gets complicated. What did the 
Court mean by “last resort”, and what would make internment “a measure of last resort”? 
Article 42 of the Fourth Geneva Convention expresses that “internment or placing in 
assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining 
Power makes it absolutely necessary”. Under IHL, internment of protected person can only be 
ordered when it is “absolutely necessary”, and under Article 78 of the same Convention, the 
Occupying Power can consider internment if “necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to 
take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to as-
signed residence or to internment”. Internment is considered a “severe” measure” according to 
Article 41, but it does not say that other measures must be exhausted before internment can be 
considered.177 The expression “last resort” can imply that other measures must be exhausted 
before internment can be allowed. Such an understanding can also imply that the measure of 
“last resort” is also the most “severe” measure to be undertaken. Accordingly, the Court could 
have interpreted the above noted Articles of the Geneva Convention as expressing such an 
understanding of internment. Not that all other measures had to be exhausted, but contrary to 
internment, other measures failed or would have failed to meet the requirements of imperative 
security reasons. This is also supported in the plain text of Article 41 and 42. They stipulate, 
respectively, that internment is the most severe measure to which the authorities may resort to 
if they consider other measures of control “inadequate”, and that such recourse may be re-
quired only where “the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary”. It is 
not required by the Detaining Power to give reasons for why internment is absolutely neces-
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sary and other measures being inadequate. The law of belligerent occupation empowers, but it 
does not obligate, the occupation authorities to detain on security grounds.178 Accordingly, 
internment under IHL was also not considered to be the only measure a Detaining Power 
could resort to, and thus, the UK was neither in the Security Council Resolution nor under 
IHL obliged to use internment, and therefore there did not exist a norm conflict. As a result, 
the Court when applying its jurisdiction under Article 19 of the ECHR to interpret Article 
5(1) concluded a violation of the Convention duty not to use internment.179 
In Al-Jedda, the Court went to great lengths to harmonize the text of the Resolution 
and the provisions of IHL with Article 5 of the ECHR. Interpreting “authorization” to take all 
measures necessary to maintain security and stability as only giving the Member States an 
opportunity to choose among the measures available, and not directly “obliging” the Member 
States to use internment, show have far the European Court will go to avoid any norm con-
flict. In Nada v. Switzerland this was expressed by the Court in these words: 
 
“[w]here a number of apparently contradictory instruments are simultaneously applicable, interna-
tional case-law and academic opinion endeavour to construe them in such a way as to coordinate their 
effects and avoid any opposition between them. Two diverging commitments must therefore be har-
monised as far as possible so that they produce effects that are fully in accordance with existing 
law”.180 
 
The Court could have approached the matter differently. Had the Security Resolution or IHL 
obliged the Member States to use internment, the Court could still have concluded that under 
its jurisdiction it can only apply the ECHR and regardless of what Article 103 or lex specialis 
of IHL would entail, the Court can only apply ECHR and accordingly constitute a breach of 
Article 5(1).181  
The reluctance of the European Court to declare explicitly the existence of a clear 
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norm conflict is consistent. Had the Resolution text been clear, however, it would be a clear 
norm conflict, and the Court could not have harmoniously interpreted in good faith. The solu-
tion would have had to be that the obligation under the Convention would be set aside to the 
extent that it conflicted with obligations pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter.182 The 
obligations under article 103 would “prevail”, but not invalidate the conflicting treaty norm. 
The State is merely prohibited from fulfilling an obligation arising under that other norm. 183 
In Al-Jedda none of the listed sub-paragraphs could faithfully be interpreted as allow-
ing for preventive detention.184 Accordingly, in the absence of derogation under Article 15, 
Article 5(1) cannot be interpreted as to contain an arbitrariness standard such as CCPR Article 
9(1). Had ECHR encapsulated such “arbitrariness” standards, the arguments used by the ICJ 
in Nuclear Weaspons case, could have been applied by ECtHR. The definition of arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty in the context of an armed conflict could then be considered through the 
prism of IHL based on the lex specialis principle that governs the relationship between the 
two bodies of law. Without such a wording, if either a Security Council Resolution in the fu-
ture or provision under IHL did impose a duty of preventive detention, there would exist a 
clear norm conflict, which could not be harmonized through interpretation. If ECHR were to 
be forcibly interpreted in such a way, to paraphrase Lord Bingham’s view of such practices in 
the context of the Human Rights Act 1998, it would not constitute “judicial interpretation, but 
judicial vandalism”.185 As Milanovic argues, “it would in effect amount to a court disregard-
ing a clear norm emanating from one treaty in favour of another, on the basis of a policy 
judgement as to the norm’s desirability, reasonableness, or effectiveness”.186 If lex specialis is 
to be understood as a rule of norm conflict resolution, on the other hand, it would entail that 
IHL prevails over ECHR Article 5(1). This understanding of the maxim is the only one com-
patible for allowing a state to preclude its responsibilities under the European Convention in a 
situation of armed conflict without it using the derogation clause. Nevertheless, such an 
understanding of lex specialis is not found neither in the text of the relevant treaties nor in the 
case law of international courts. Contrary, in all cases noted above; Nuclear Weapons, The 
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Wall, DCR v. Uganda, all confirm that IHRL continues to apply in times of armed conflict 
alongside IHL. IHL affected only one aspect, namely the relative assessment of ‘arbitrari-
ness’.187 For violations of human rights obligations not to be liable to the state in situations of 
armed conflict governed by IHL, the only recourse is to activate the derogation clause of Arti-
cle 15. Only then can IHL said to be applied lex specialis as a rule of norm conflict resolution 
setting aside the derogated provisions of IHLR.   
 
4 CONCLUSION  
The confirmation by the ECtHR that the European Convention applies extraterritorially re-
inforces the understanding that it cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpe-
trate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpe-
trate on its own territory. If IHL and IHRL have a common and identical interest in the pro-
tection of the individual from all possible threats to his person, in peacetime and in conflict, it 
is necessary that both these two fields of international law find complementarity. This appeal 
of universality, most certainly serves the object and purpose of the human rights conventions 
in securing the rights and freedoms to all individuals whoever they are and wherever they 
may be. Both the ECtHR and States need to move beyond the debate on whether States have 
extraterritorial human rights obligations and toward determining what human rights obliga-
tions we can realistically expect States to uphold in situations of armed conflict.188  
The extensive analysis of the case-law on the relationship between IHRL and IHL 
shows that human rights law continues to apply in situations of armed conflict. However, how 
they interact is understood differently. The jurisprudence of ICJ suggests that IHL is the lex 
specialis of IHRL. In Nuclear Weapons this meant that what was an arbitrary deprivation of 
life under Article 2 of ECHR was to be decided by reference to IHL standards. In the Israeli 
Wall case, ICJ approached the relationship between IHL and IHRL as either being mutually 
exclusive, or applicable together. The problem only arises where the two bodies of law are in 
clear normative conflict. If so, the body of IHL were to be applied as lex specialis. This ap-
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proach by the Israeli Wall met harsh criticism and ICJ seems to have distanced itself in the 
next case of DRC v. Uganda where the Court reaffirmed that both braches of international law 
could be applied in parallel.  
What these cases confirm is that IHRL continues to apply in times of conflict, and 
both are mutually reinforcing the protection offered to the individual. However, none of these 
cases dealt with an actual norm conflict as understood above, because all cases applied IHL 
and IHRL without having to confront the two systems. This is different in the European and 
American human rights systems. Having only the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the re-
spective human rights Conventions, put these supervisory bodies in great difficulties when 
confronted with allegations of treaty violations occurring in the context of armed conflicts. 
Since the jurisdictional competence of the ECtHR is not expected in near future to expand, the 
use of interpretation techniques such as systematic integration will be an important step in the 
development of the European Convention on Human Rights' protective mechanisms, and one 
which will enhance the Court's authority.  
Our research show that the ECtHR will go to great lengths to harmonise the interpreta-
tion of ECHR so as to meet the challenge facing its application. Having to accept that the 
ECHR contains very few explicit references to situations of armed conflict, the European 
Court had to require a whole new vocabulary and adapt its interpretation to this new reality. In 
Ergi, Özkan, and Isayeva, the Court implicitly used IHL standards as to provide the much 
needed flexibility of Article 2 in the context of armed conflict. This constitute a warning that 
even if the protection in one of the fields is found to be less than in the other field, the applic-
ability of the them together will provide the needed protection.189 
However, it must be kept in mind that while international judicial courts are independ-
ent bodies, which cannot be swayed by political considerations, they do not function in isola-
tion from the context which surrounds them. The Court’s approach to IHL implicitly in cases 
such as Ergi, Özkan, and Isayeva, may have been influenced by the atmosphere surrounding 
the cases and the States’ reluctance to have IHL applied to them. Nevertheless, from only re-
ferring to IHL sub silentio in these cases, in Kononov v. Latvia, the Court made extensive re-
ferences to IHL when interpreting Article 7. This was followed in the Al-Jedda and Al-Skeini 
cases, where the Court interpreted the question of preventive detention under IHL in direct 
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confrontation with Article 5 of the ECHR. This goes to show that, as the situations evolved 
and the Court was made to deal with more cases arising from conflict areas, the Court became 
more and more comfortable to use IHL standards and eventually also refer to them explicitly. 
As Magdalena Forowicz puts it: “the ECHR regime may therefore still be portrayed as a self-
reinforcing, but certainly not a self-sufficient regime”.190  
Accordingly, systematic integration of IHL when interpreting IHRL has become an 
important interpretation method so as to avoid any gaps in the protection of the individual. 
Nevertheless, the Court being the guardian of the ECHR, largely frame the desire to apply 
IHL standards in its reasoning only when they promote the protection under the Convention, 
and not when they restrict its application. Accordingly, our examination also shows that the 
Court does not approach the relationship between IHRL and IHL so as to reduce its fragmen-
tation. The interpretational techniques available to avoid fragmentation have been used by the 
Court with the aim of contributing the enhancement of the European system of human rights 
protection rather than to enhance the unity of international law. If the protection under IHRL 
will be reduces as a result of differing standards under IHL, the Court refuses to interpret the 
Convention restrictively, as seen in the cases of Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda.  
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ABBREVATIONS 
 
ACHR   American Convention on Human Rights 
IACtHR  Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
ICJ   International Court of Justice 
IHL   International humanitarian law 
IHRL    International human rights law 
ILC   International Law Commission 
ECHR   European Convention on Human rights 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights  
FYR   Former Yugoslavian Republic  
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
UN   United Nations 
VCLT   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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